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 INTRODUCTION  
 
Generally, strategic management literature has always been considering growth 
strategies as main means to organizational change and development (Lubatkin and 
O’Neill,   1988;;   Bowman   and   Singh,   1993;;  Capron   et   al.,   1998;;  Capron   and  Mitchell,  
1999; Karim et al., 2000), being mainly committed to portray restructuring ones as a 
reaction to strategic mistakes or a change to earlier decisions. In particular, it is meant 
as the refocusing (Markides, 1992), down scoping (Hitt et al., 1994) and patching 
(Eisenhardt and Brown, 1999; Siggelkow, 2002) process of firms. 
The increased foreign competition and the effects of the financial and economic 
crisis have raised pressure on managers to improve the performance of their 
organizations. To keep pace with the ever growing complexity and uncertainty, 
resources have to be applied properly in the context of market environment to be 
valuable (Duhaime and Grant, 1996). As the deal firms are expected to restructure their 
business portfolios to cope in the challenging markets. In this context, divestiture 
emerges as valuable strategy for building shareholder wealth (Moschieri and Mair, 
2008; Moschieri and Mair, 2011). This is a tool to propel firms change process through 
the redeployment and disposal of resources as well by the uprooting of underperforming 
ones (Capron et al., 2001). Actually, the global divestiture activity has been relatively 
resilient during the past recent years. The volume and value of divestiture transactions 
have been increasing till the end of 2009 to reach the peak of 12.000 transactions, 
experiencing a global increase of 15% compared to 2005 (source Thomson Financials). 
Despite a relatively sound understanding of the antecedents and outcomes of 
divestiture activity is gradually arising (Brauer, 2006; Lee and Madhavan, 2010), some 
very basic questions remain unanswered concerning whether and how parent ties with 
divested unit are related to value creation. Once selected what to divest, casting it for a 
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value-enhancing disposition poses a variety of strategic challenges. Specifically, the 
newly established governance structure might create both risks and opportunities, 
especially having concern the divestiture mode chosen.  
Therefore, the present project offers a valuable contribution to literature on 
divestiture, deepening the understanding of the relation between divestiture mode 
choice and value creation. Moreover, it sheds light on a neglected issue of corporate 
governance enhancing its potential value as signal. 
Specifically, the sweeping research question of this project is: How do corporate 
governance mechanisms affect divestiture performance? To answer this question three 
essays are presented, each addressing a specific aspect of the compelling issue. 
The first essay is organized on an introduction to detailing the research question, 
followed by an analytical literature review and a compelling research agenda. The two 
subsequent essays are instead structured similarly: after an introductory paragraph 
defining the research question, the significant literature is reviewed, followed by a 
description of the data and methodology used, an exhibition of the empirical results and 
their interpretation, and a summarizing conclusion.  
The first essay examines the theoretical perspectives and research findings on 
divestiture mode choice to draw the current state of knowledge and outline a set of issue 
for further research on the topic. Even if scholars have analyzed the relationship 
between corporate divestiture and subsequent firm performance, fragmented findings 
persist as referred to the divestiture mode chosen. Divestiture entails a wide range of 
corporate restructuring activities: spin offs, sell offs and equity carve outs. This essay 
provides a key insight on research on divestiture mode alternatives to identify common 
threads and gaps, and to propose some patterns for future studies illustrating the 
possible range of questions that should be asked. To achieve this aim the following 
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research question will be address: What is acquired and what should be acquired in 
literature on the relationship between divestiture mode choice and value creation? 
The second essay explores the relationship between board characteristics of a 
divested unit and wealth creation. It offers support to demonstrate that the subjectivity 
of board characteristics might affect firm market valuation. Deeming the board of 
directors as a compelling signalling device satisfies two key criteria. First, the board 
composition is observable;;   second,   it’s   a difficult and costly signal to replicate. 
Specifically, the essay presents the results of an empirical study of the impact of 
overlapping directorss on underpricing of divested firms. Overlapping directors are 
meant as those ones employed also by the parent firm at the time the divestiture 
operation is undergone. It is further proposed that board structure is not uniform in its 
effects on the underpricing of divested firms, but rather varies across the percentage of 
overlapping directors as well as the capital stake divested by parent firm on the stock 
market. Examining the effects of board structure in a divestiture context lets us to 
capture the capital market predictions to the viability of overlapping directors, thus 
answering to the following research questions: How do overlapping directors affect the 
underpricing of divested firm? How does the percentage of capital divested by the 
parent firm moderate this effect? 
The third essay employs a corporate governance perspective to examine interlinks 
between board of directors composition and parent stock market reaction to equity carve 
out announcement. Uncertainty regarding subsequent parent strategies and lack of 
codified interrelation data between parent and subsidiary present market investors with 
equivocal guidance about parent gains. The essay questions whether the presence of 
overlapping directors provides investors with a stronger and clearer outlook about 
parent strategic venue. Even if the signalling firm already has a market track record, 
investors’  valuation  might  be   affected  by   the  presence  of  overlapping directors in the 
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carved out subsidiary board. To investigate this topic, the essay addresses the following 
research question: How do overlapping directors affect to divesting firm value creation? 
A concluding paragraph summarises and comments the findings, identifies recurring 
themes, and highlights venues for future research. 
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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Several studies have examined the relationship between corporate divestiture and 
subsequent firm performance, however fragmented findings persist as referred to the 
divestiture mode chosen. Divestiture entails a wide range of corporate restructuring 
activities: spin offs, sell offs and equity carve outs. Herein, we examine the theoretical 
perspectives and research findings on divestiture mode choice to trace out the current 
state of knowledge on the topic and draft a meaningful agenda for future works. 
Actually, we point some patterns for further research meant to illustrate the possible 
range of questions that should be asked. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: divestiture, corporate restructuring, firm performance, spin off, sell off, 
equity carve out. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 12 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Substantial changes and turbulences in business environments are affecting 
dramatically the way firms compete. Critical argument is that resources have to be 
applied properly in the context of market environment to be valuable (Grant, 1991). To 
keep pace with the evolving environment firms need to renovate their resources in the 
face of the inertial forces (Henderson and Cockburn, 1994; Makadok and Walker, 2000; 
Teece, 2007; Capron, Dussauge and Mitchell, 1998). Specifically, they have to scrape 
up new resources (Caves, 1982; Teece, 1982), uproot the underperforming (Capron et 
al., 2001) and ease the remaining ones towards new business applications (Penrose, 
1959).  
Generally, strategic management literature has always been considering growth 
strategies as main means to organizational change and development (Lubatkin and 
O’Neill,   1988;;   Bowman   and   Singh,   1993;;  Capron   et   al.,   1998;;  Capron   and  Mitchell,  
1999; Karim et al., 2000), being mainly committed to portray divestitures as a reaction 
to strategic mistakes or a change to earlier decisions. Yet, scholars have recently gauged 
that divestiture operations represent a keystone in firm value creation (Bergh, 1995; 
Bergh et al., 2008; Brauer, 2006; Moschieri and Mair, 2008) propelling change process 
such as redeployment and disposal of resources. As a matter of fact, divestitures can be 
no longer deemed as a sign of failure, but rather a tool to create and preserve 
shareholders’  wealth  (Montgomery  et  al.,  1984;;  Kyimaz,  2003).  
A significant amount of academic works has been written about divestiture. Previous 
empirical studies have been mostly focused on performance implications whether 
divestitures are reflections of the economic cycle (Garvin, 1983; Duhaime and Grant, 
1984; Aron, 1991; Ito, 1995), a means to reverse previous strategic decisions (Markides, 
1992; Hoskisson et al.), or proactive strategic options (McGahan and Villalonga, 2003). 
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However, despite the increasing interest devoted to divestitures in both academic and 
managerial journals, little is still known about the way firms ought to take their 
divestiture decisions to further the performance. Specifically, no explicit guidance has 
been provided about how the choice among alternative methods of corporate divestiture 
is related to value. Some attention has been paid to structural requisites of organizations 
as remedies to causal ambiguity to justify divestiture mode choice (Cording et al., 2008). 
Others drawing on organizational learning have studied   whether   a   firm’s   experience  
with a particular mode improves its ability to manage that mode (Zollo and Singh, 
2004; Anand and Khanna, 2000; Mayer and Argyres, 2004). 
Our main challenge is to review existing research on divestiture mode alternatives to 
identify common threads and gaps, and to propose some ideas and avenues for future 
studies. Departing from this kind of insights, the present study takes under proper 
concern that divestiture modes differ over firm value creation. Thus far, scholars have 
mainly considered that divestiture performance problems arise from underestimated 
implementation difficulties, rather than from selection mistakes (Jacobides and Billinger, 
2006). Yet, selection capability differs from implementation capability. Divestiture 
entails a wide range of corporate restructuring activities: spin offs, sell offs and equity 
carve outs. Even if these strategies serve similar objectives, they differ in their ability to 
cope with the characteristics of the firms involved and in their strategic implications 
(Rosenkopf and Nerkar, 2001; Menon and Pfeffer, 2003). Making the right choice of 
divestiture mode has an important impact on the subsequent ability of the firm to deploy 
effectively its skills to meet rent-achieving goals, especially for the tie opportunities 
acknowledged. To deepen our understanding on this topic, the following research 
question will be address: What is acquired and what should be acquired in literature on 
the relationship between divestiture mode choice and value creation? 
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Assuming that firms recognize opportunities and risks shaping their foresights, we 
want to contribute to the understanding of how divestiture mode choice adds value 
through its staggering effect on strategic performance outcomes. We aim to demonstrate 
that   “one-fits-all”   approach   of   firm   divestitures turns out inappropriate and counter-
productive. Moreover, this study might help to plot out more effectively than hitherto 
some of the strategic tools firms should employ to succeed in the long run.  
We have developed an analytical review for systematically evaluate the current state 
of knowledge on this topic and draft a meaningful agenda for future research. We 
summarise the findings of the major published studies to reveal the patterns of 
theoretical arguments. 
 
 
REVIEW 
 
Divestitures, meant as firms reconfigurations of business portfolios via spin offs, sell 
offs and equity carve outs, are expensive, visible and risky actions. A growing attention 
has been paid to these events since now considered as an important complement on the 
menu of corporate strategy actions. Despite the increasing number of studies there is 
scant consensus among scholars as to whether divestitures represent effectively value-
enhancing   tools   (Lee   and   Madhavan,   2010).   In   today’s   competitive   environment,  
managers   must   continually   “recreate”   their   firms, propelling change process such as 
redeployment and disposal of resources to draw new capabilities. The starting point for 
such changes is dynamic leadership. However, even the best and brightest among us 
need to choose modes of change that suit a particular context, and then manage the 
change process in a way that suits these modes. Therefore, an explanation for such mix 
results on divestitures performance might be due to the misleading boundaries of the 
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construct employed. As mentioned previously, divestiture entails a number of types of 
events   that   differently   modify   the   firms’   lines   of   business   and   their   configurations.  
Actually, even if pursuing similar objectives, they lead different strategic implications 
that in turn might affect the events outcomes. Addressing this aspect, it could well be 
stated that a deeper consideration of the performance implications of different types of 
divestitures should be given.  
A quite clear taxonomy of the three main types of divestitures is provided by the 
literature: spin offs, sell offs and equity carve outs. In each of these modes, the parent 
undergoes an operation for different reason and in search of different objectives and 
therefore maintains a specific relationship with the divested unit. Specifically, a sell off 
involves the disposal by the selling firm of subsidiaries, divisions or other combination 
of fixed assets in exchange for cash. The sold assets are absorbed by the acquiring firm 
and become part of it (Rosenfeld, 1984). A spin off represents a pro-rata distribution of 
shares of a subsidiary to the shareholders of the parent firm in order to constitute a 
separate and tradable firm, thus no cash transaction takes place (Ito and Rose, 1994). An 
equity carve out is experienced when a firm divests a business division issuing a portion 
of its equity shares to the market as an independent company (Schipper and Smith, 
1986).  
 
Divestiture explanations 
Generally speaking, scholars suggest that firms decide to divest for either corrective 
or proactive reasons. Corrective divestitures are intended to recover previous strategic 
mistakes (Hitt et al., 1996; Porter, 1987), to reduce diversification refocusing on core 
businesses (Hoskisson et al., 1994; Markides, 1992; Seth et al., 1993), to react to 
increased industry competitions (Aron, 1991), to eliminate negative synergies (Linn and 
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Rozeff, 1985; Rosenfeld, 1984) or to deal with organizational issue such as bad 
governance (Hoskisson et al., 1994). The purpose of proactive divestiture is to 
restructure  the  company’s business portfolio (Bowman et al., 1999; Hitt et al., 1996) by 
splitting, transferring or exiting businesses to adapt to arising market opportunities 
(Eisenardht et al., 1999). This reconfiguration process is aimed at designing a more 
efficient governance form (Seward et al., 1996), improving performance and 
profitability (Haynes et al., 2002; Mitchell, 1994; Woo et al., 1992), reducing high 
levels of debt (Allen and McConnell, 1998), getting better contracts from regulators 
(Woo et al., 1992), and improving corporate innovativeness and entrepreneurship 
(Cassman and Ueda, 2004).  
However, these objectives are not mutually exclusive and limited to just one specific 
divestiture mode. For this reason literature has partially neglected the simultaneous 
comparison among divestiture mode options. Since the alternative methods of 
divestiture structurally differ, factors that determine the choice of divestiture are likely 
to influence the value of the deal, thus the net benefits of the transaction will depend on 
the method chosen. Understanding the motivations for selecting a specific type of 
transaction might allow scholars to begin to identify the source of the gains that result. 
Actually, companies follow logic when they engage in a divestiture operation. We 
believe it is important to recognize the different reasons for which a company decides to 
divest in order to deepen our understanding of their performance implications. 
Therefore, we propose an analytical review, which groups divestiture modes literature 
according to the logic pursued. In this categorization divestiture mode choice can be 
motivated either by financial or strategy logics. This filing tries to link corporate 
strategy and financial valuation and helps to account for some unexplored venues 
behind divestiture mode choice. A starting point for our review is to determine whether 
the variables that scholars have identified as influencing the divestiture value creation 
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are also been stated as capable of differentiating between the divestiture options. Thus, 
from time to time additional variables will be introduced that also have been considered 
able to differentiate between modes choice. 
 
Financial logic 
Since sell offs generate liquid assets from a sale and spin offs do not, firms in 
financial distress should be more likely to sell off assets. Steiner (1997) compares firms 
that sell off assets with firms that do not divest. He reports that the higher the level of 
long-term debt to total assets, the higher the probability of a sell off. Afshar et al. (1992) 
and Lasfer et al. (1996) suggest that firms in financial distress experience a positive 
market reaction when divesting a bundle of assets and event abnormal returns are 
positively  related  to   the  divesting  firm’s  degree  of   leverage.  Specifically,  Brown  et  al.  
(1994) show that financially distressed sellers generate higher stock returns than 
financially healthy ones.  One way to deal with financial distress is to generate cash 
through the sale to repay debt. Sicherman and Pettway (1987) state that as financially 
distressed firms have more limited access to capital markets, the divestiture provides a 
less expensive source of funding to be used in the pursuit of other projects and therefore 
results in abnormal gains. This reasoning has been confirmed also by Lang et al. (1995) 
arguments finding that the stock price reaction is positive for sellers that are expected to 
use the proceed from sell off to pay down debt, but negative for sellers which are 
expected to retain the proceeds within the firm. The rationale is that shareholders 
anticipate that management may use funds not subject to the controls of the financial 
markets in order to invest in wasteful projects. Afshar et al. (1992) find that 
announcement mitigating uncertainties regarding aspects of the operation result in 
higher  abnormal   returns   for  seller   in   the  event  day.   Indeed,  Datta  et  al.’s   (2003)  work  
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shows that a high level of private lender monitoring plays a crucial role in explaining 
seller’s  stock  return  since  divesting  firms  are  less  likely  to  misallocate  funds  and  destroy  
value.  However, support for the financial theories of sell off gains is weakened by 
findings of no relationship between pre-divestiture financial distress and observed 
returns  (Miles  and  Rosenfeld,  1983;;  Desai  and  Jain,  1999).  Therefore,  the  Nixon  et  al.’s  
(2000) deduction that firm with higher level of financial leverage might have a higher 
incentive to undergo a sell off than a spin off seems less compelling. Actually, Johnson 
et al. (1996) find that firms engaging in spin offs are more highly levered than industry 
rivals. Firms with risky debt might be induced to reject positive net present value 
projects since their benefits can accrue existing bondholders too, leaving less value to 
the shareholders. Hite and Owers (1983) link this rationale to the bondholders wealth 
expropriation hypothesis since the spin off is structured in a manner that investments 
opportunities can be undertaken with benefits accruing the equity holders. However, 
Schipper and Smith (1983) as well as Dittmar (2000) state that bond returns are not 
significantly different from zero at the announcement. Only Parrino (1997) in the 
Marriott spin off case study finds that the operation reduced the collateral on the parent 
firm existing debt, as well as the bondholders’ claims on the business cash flows. The 
main aim was to enable the company to fully exploit value creating growth 
opportunities in the management business by reducing capital constraint. Specifically, 
John (1993) referring to coinsurance arguments on investment incentives states that the 
value creation associated to a spin off results from the combined effects of changes in 
agency costs and tax shields since benefit from the effects of a flexible allocation of 
debt across technologies. Also equity carve outs accomplish the financial need since the 
offerings generate cash for the parent firm through a public sale of equity that has a 
claim only to the carve   out’s   unit   cash   flows.   Thus,   as   asset   sell   offs   these   can   be  
viewed as mechanisms of raising funds for a parent firm that is not willing to bypass the 
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monitoring intrinsic to a public securities offerings (Slovin et al., 1995). Indeed, Lang et 
al. (1995) report positive share price effects for parent firms that do not retain proceeds 
of an asset sale, confirming that agency concerns represent a factor in sell offs. For 
equity carve outs Allen and McConnell (1998) suggest that managers being reluctant to 
carve out subsidiaries ascribing high value to control over assets, will undergo the 
operation only when the firm is capital constraint, and they also state that 
announcements period returns are higher in average when the parent firm uses the 
proceeds to repay debt. Fu (2002) finds additional support in the form of abnormal 
returns being significantly greater when proceeds are paid out to creditors or 
shareholders, rather than retained for investment purposes. This seems to give support 
to the presence of agency  concerns.  However,  Nanda’s  (1991)  main  conjuncture  is  that  
by conducting equity carve out, a firm not only reveals information about the value of 
the subsidiary, but also about its own value. In his model, parent firms choosing equity 
carve outs tend to be undervalued by the market. Thus, according to a financial rationale 
it will prefer to issue subsidiary stock instead of undergo a seasoned offering. Slovin et 
al. (1995) operationalise this conjecture by assuming that if parent firms choosing an 
equity carve out are undervalued, rival firms in the parent industry should show positive 
abnormal return when the parent firm announces the deal, whereas rival firms in the 
subsidiary industry should show negative abnormal returns. They find empirical 
evidence for the latter but not for the former. Also Hulburt et al. (2002) find a negative 
price  reaction  to  equity  carve  out  announcement  of  companies  in  the  parent’s  industry,  
which directly contradicts the suggested hypothesis. 
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Strategic logic 
The desire to refocus the firm can be accomplished with either sell offs, spin offs or 
equity carve outs. All divestiture types can reduce diseconomies of diversity or 
inefficient size since they let to eliminate negative synergies between the divesting firm 
operations and the divested unit (Schipper and Smith, 1986). Specifically, both 
Markides and Bergh (1992) and John and Ofek (1995) state that sell offs enable the 
corporation to focus on businesses in which it has a competitive advantage and remove 
assets which interfere with other operations, lead to more efficient allocation of 
management  time.  Alexander  et  al.’s  (1984)  arguments  suggest  that  the  decision  to  sell  
unprofitable division is associated with value enhancement for the selling firm. 
Empirical evidence has   been   found   in   Denning   (1988)   and   Cho   and   Cohen’s   (1997)  
works confirming that if an underperforming unit drives the poor performance of the 
firm, its subsequent disposal results in a positive parent share price reaction. Steiner 
(1997) finds that sell offs are negatively related to corporate performance prior to the 
operation. Spin offs typically follow period of strong market performance as asserted by 
Jain (1985) and Miles and Rosenfeld (1983) that report positive excess return prior to 
the spin off announcement. This would suggest that the probability of a spin off relative 
to a sell off might be higher when the operating performance margin is higher. An 
additional explanation is offered by Begh et al. (2008). They state that firms divesting 
assets in their secondary businesses or firms with higher levels of diversification are 
likely to choose sell offs, as compared to spin offs, since the value of the businesses is 
relatively transparent to the market and because sell offs are best in simulate auctions 
that enhancing competitive bidding forces to reallocate the assets to their most efficient 
and productive uses. On the other hand, firms divesting assets in primary business lines 
or with low level of diversification are likely to incur higher information asymmetry 
problems between insiders and outsiders about the true value of the unit. Therefore, 
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such firms may prefer spin offs to mitigate information asymmetry concerns. In their 
work they empirically show that these choices mediate the relationship between 
corporate restructuring activities and financial performance. However, Cusatis et al. 
(1994) argue that the inability of the market to evaluate conglomerate structure with 
unrelated business favour a spin off over a sell off because current shareholders receive 
the increased value from the reduced asymmetry after the spin off. Current shareholders 
would not receive the benefits from the sale of an undervalued asset. Indeed, Ito and 
Rose (1994) demonstrate that spin offs can create value since parents benefit from 
maintaining the entrepreneurship of a small firm all the while taking advantage of the 
availability of the assets of larger firms. Parhankangas and Arenius (2003) alert that 
even if a strong intra-organisational relationship is essential for the renewal and 
development of the competences in spun off firms, sharing a too intense relationship is 
beneficial to a limit over which embeddeness starts. However, even if considering this 
aspect, spin offs represent valuable and flexible tools to survive in highly competitive 
environment. Ito (1995) states that their attitude to create wealth is enhanced under 
conditions of homogeneous society, informal contracts, stable shareholders since under 
these conditions the separation of the organizations lets to benefit from economies of 
scope even if the diversification process is not led within a single firm. Miles and 
Rosenfeld (1983) state a positive relationship between the spun off unit relative size and 
its wealth effects. Indeed, Chemmanur and Yan (2004) state that the magnitude of the 
positive effect of the market value at the announcement increases in line with the size of 
the division divested as a fraction of the joint firms. Miles and Rosenfeld (1983) analyze 
55 operations demonstrating that major spin offs have a greater effect on the 
shareholder wealth enhancement due to the increase of the value of future growth 
opportunities.  Also  Hite   and  Owers’s   study   (1983),   as  well   as   by  Krishnaswami   and  
Subramaniam’s  one  (1999)  confirmed  the  phenomenon  according to which the wealth 
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effects are larger when the portion of assets divested is higher. Along this vain, both 
Daley et al. (1997) and Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999) question whether spin 
offs aimed to increase the industry focus of the parent firm are characterized by higher 
stock market gains than the other ones. Recalling transaction costs arguments Ito (1995) 
confirms these results suggesting that the positive effects are stronger when the parent is 
low technology but owns a higher technology division. Yet, Rose and Ito (2005) 
employing an evolutionary approach come to different results demonstrating that 
subsidiary operating in the same industry as the parent tends to underperform the latter 
one. However, Desai and Jain (1999) offer a deeper analysis based on three alternative 
measures of relatedness in order to achieve evidence in line with the previous results: 
the abnormal returns for the focus-increasing spin offs are higher than those for the non-
focusing ones. In order to move forward their results, they observe the long-term 
performance of the divested divisions after the operations. The refocusing rationale is 
confirmed since the abnormal returns for multiple years holding periods are significant 
given focusing increasing deals. Along this vein, Woo et al. (1992) examined 51 
voluntary deals focusing on performance of divested units finding no change in pre and 
post deal performance, but observing that performance gains of related subsidiaries 
exceed those of unrelated ones following divestitures. This reasoning recalls some 
information asymmetry concerns. Since external capital markets suffer from lack of 
information compared to firm management, a misevaluation of it might easily occur 
increasing the wealth effects associated to the spin off announcement (Krishnaswami 
and Subramaniam, 1999).  Also Habib et al. (1997) offer a model in order to study the 
existing relation between information asymmetry and spin off performance. In 
particular they state that the greater availability of information associated to the 
subsidiary securities exchanged on the market makes the price system more efficient 
increasing the summed value of the parent firm and of is spun off subsidiary. Parrino 
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(1997) demonstrates through the analysis of the Marriott spin off the accrued ability of 
the capital markets to assess the true value of the firm by improving the quality of the 
financial information available to investors. Scholars have demonstrated that the effect 
is even stronger when referred to equity carve outs context. Schipper and Smith (1986) 
and  Vijh  (2002)  state  that  as  the  information  availability  regarding  the  subsidiary  firm’s  
performance increases, investors are more inclined to invest into the new pure-play 
stock. Since the separate financial statements and publicly traded equity can improve 
the ability of investors to gather information (Gilson et al., 2001), the divested unit, 
trading as a public company, will receive direct scrutiny by analysts and potential 
investors, reducing the asymmetric information concerning its value. Specifically, 
Schipper and Smith (1986) are the first to analyse the effect of equity carve out 
announcement. As main explanation they suggest that the operating efficiency is likely 
to increase as a result of business restructuring and more incentive-oriented contracts 
for   subsidiary   firm  managers.   This   introduces   another   issue   that   has   caught   scholars’  
interest in the divestiture framework: a corporate governance concern. A negative 
relation between the percentage of ownership by officers and directors and the 
probability  of  a  sell  off  has  been  stated  by  Steiner’s  (1997)  work.  Since  sell  offs  provide  
the potential for discretionary cash, managers with a low percentage of ownership may 
prefer them to other divestiture alternatives. Actually, spin off and equity carve outs 
seem to represent ideal tools to solve agency matters. Chemmanur and Yan (2004) state 
that  the  parent’s  threat  of  losing formal control of the spun off unit motivates it to work 
harder at managing the firm. This effect is even stronger for firms operating in 
industries with high degree of takeover activity, or characterized by rapid technological 
changes. In line with this rationale, Aron (1991) asserts that even only the possibility of 
a future spin off improves current incentives for managers. Specifically, referring to 
equity carve outs he suggests that once the market valuation of the unit is separated 
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from the parent ones, managerial compensation can be provided in accordance with 
movements in the market value of the unit. Moreover, the fact that the unit is publicly-
traded might makes it a more viable take-over candidate if it does not perform as well as 
expected, which may motivate its managers to perform well as a means of avoiding 
take-over attempts. However, these arguments include the tacit premise that the 
subsidiaries remain public. Klein et al. (1991) find that public listing is a temporary 
situation for the divisions since most become non-listed or lose the relationship with the 
parent by other events after the carve outs. They conclude that these represent a series 
of corporate restructuring and Hulburt (2003) states that also investors seem partially 
able to anticipate the second event: equity carve out announcement followed by an 
eventual takeover of the divested subsidiary by a third party produce higher abnormal 
returns than announcement not followed by a takeover. Indeed, considering their nature 
as temporary arrangements Perotti and Rossetto (2007) state that they represent real 
options that allow the parent firm to profit from the resolution of uncertainty. 
Uncertainty  in   the  subsidiary’s   industry  and  the  foreseen  synergies  between  the  parent  
and the divested unit, make one-sided actions such as sell offs unattractive. These 
arguments are further deepened by Damaraju (2008). Since the full value of the 
business unit may not be realized under conditions of uncertainty, by choosing spin offs 
or equity carve outs, parent firms may benefit from the access to valuable information in 
the   subsidiary   industries’   and   adjust   the   divestiture   strategy   as   additional   information  
arrives. According to the situation evolution, the subsidiary can be further divested at a 
better price,  or  brought  back  into  the  parent’s  fold  more  easily  as  opposed  to  sell  offs.  
However, in any cases again the parent firm will have the possibility to choose a course 
of action that best fits its strategic requirements. Viewed this way, choosing to perform 
spin offs or equity carve outs, instead of complete sales, creates more value with 
increasing  uncertainty  in  a  subsidiary’s  environment. 
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RESEARCH AGENDA 
 
According   to  Pearsall   (2002),   an   agenda   is   “a   list   of  matters   to  be   addressed.”  As 
such, this agenda is intended as a list of matters associated to the relationship between 
mode of divestiture and value creation that would appear to warrant investigation 
through empirical research. The increasing emphasis on the value creation implications 
of divestiture mode choice brings out a rather bright side of a decision that has been 
typically taken for granted. The main limitation of an agenda that even if based on a 
comprehensive and systematic review of the literature, it is a personal view. Others may 
consider the issues more or less important and may wish to add to the agenda. 
Dess et al. (2003) suggest there is an important need for future research to show how 
firms develop effective structures. The main contribution of previous analyses is to 
provide some evidence on how divestitures of business units vary in terms of their 
strategic implications and, as such, can represent the expression of different strategic 
objectives of divesting firms. Our contribution points to some avenues for further 
research not meant to be exhaustive, but to illustrate the possible range of questions that 
one might ask. An answer to these questions, in our opinion, not only adds to the 
empirical canon but also suggests theoretical departures from how we are viewing the 
modes of divestiture. Our review shows that not only investing, but also divesting might 
represent a right decision to achieve economic growth. Comparing the different ways of 
divestiture settings, their advantages and drawbacks, several reasons seem to motivate 
the firm choice among the different corporate unbundling strategies. A lot depends on 
their exact form, given that the types differ in their mechanisms, effects and legal 
implications. 
Although scholars have identified many divestiture antecedents, it still remains 
unclear how these factors might jointly affect the divestiture mode choice. We realize 
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that empirical research is reductionist by design, so we are not surprised that many 
individual factors that affect divestiture behaviour have been isolated. We suggest that 
the field might benefit from developing a deeper understanding of the relative 
importance of, and contingency conditions associated with, those drivers. Scholars have 
partially neglected the specific actions and incentive forces managers have to deal with 
during the divestiture process. Some may be better than others at developing and 
managing newly established relationships among corporate elements to achieve a 
competitive advantage. This consideration raises compelling issues from a corporate 
governance perspective. A key resource for firms is represented by the idiosyncratic 
knowledge possessed by managers, especially in the case of opportunity recognition 
(Castanias and Helfat, 2001). Work has been done to present managers as rational utility 
maximizing beings (Paton and Wilson, 2001). In reality they have incomplete 
knowledge with which to generate subjective interpretations about the organization. 
These could be mold through corporate governance systems willing to boost 
management perception of opportunities. Up to now, studies have mainly tended to 
focus on managerial perception of competition, and it would seem reasonable to assume 
that an equally reach vein of research findings remains to be investigated regarding 
managerial perception of inter-firm relationship. Since methods of divestiture provide 
different organizational arrangements, it seems noteworthy to deepen research on this 
overlooked aspect. 
Even if divestitures are often treated as independent events, most are actually a 
component of a broader restructuring strategy, which is likely to require significant 
sequential organizational events (Otsubo, 2009). Following this argument, the 
performance   implications   of   a   single   divestiture   are   dependent   on   that   divestiture’s  
position within the restructuring sequence. Thus, accounting for divestiture strategy as a 
long-time  process  rather  than  a  “one-shot  game”,  can  reveal  potential  gains  associated  
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to different divestiture modes that are often overlooked when examining single events. 
Specifically, we encourage future research to explore how divestiture modes might 
differently foster effective broader restructuring strategies. In short there is much to 
learn about divestiture implementation, having concern how the single mode resolves, 
transfers and manages the resources of the detached entities, which underscores the 
need for greater focus on post deal management in general. 
We also see value in more fully examining the influence of governance mechanisms 
on divestiture mode decision. A simplifying assumption underlying the agency theory 
perspective is that shareholders hold homogeneous profit maximization interests. Also 
assumed is that large shareholders fulfil external monitoring roles and, furthermore may 
initiate activist measures to discipline ineffective management (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1997). However, evidence demonstrates that large shareholders often seek opportunistic 
interests and can have heterogeneous objectives, which may not align with the goals of 
others (Claessens, et al., 2002; La Porta, et al., 2000). Moreover, powerful and active 
minority shareholders have emerged in recent years, such as rapidly growing hedge 
funds or activist investors, who often seek to pressure managers into specific 
transactions that hold benefit for them yet, arguably, are not always in the best interests 
of the broader shareholder base (Anabtawi, 2006). Although executives and other 
stakeholders like investment firms increasingly make tradeoffs between divestiture 
mode choices, we know little about how these tradeoffs as value creation vehicles are 
managed or staged. For instance, they might decide to take a business public to find a 
more strategic   buyer   or   instead   to   “tee   up”   subsequent transactions by increasing the 
visibility.  Surprisingly, beyond a very general understanding (Reuer and Shen, 2003), 
rarely do we see these topics linked in academic studies. 
Although empirical evidence demonstrates that environmental determinants such as 
market attractiveness are less important predictors of divestiture decisions than firm 
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level factors such as financial performance or corporate strategy (Dixit and Chintagunta, 
2007), researchers should not cease to deeper their influence on divestiture mode. 
Indeed, no study investigates the question on whether and how different levels of 
market attractiveness influence the choice among divestiture types. Future studies could 
use more elaborate measure for investigating the impact of environmental factors on the 
divestiture mode value creation. Along this vein, two additional points of critique 
should be voiced: how legal attributes across geographies can affect divestiture mode 
attitude to create value. Even if assuming the causality between divestiture mode choice 
and value creation, it cannot be ruled out yet with certainty whether exogenous factors 
as legal ones concurrently influences both phenomena.  
We also recommend that researches focus on deepening our knowledge of several 
outcomes of interest. Indeed, little is known about how divestiture modes affect rival 
firms in the market. Specifically, we know little of the long-term consequences of 
divestiture mode for other firms in the industry. For example, sell offs might lead to 
industry consolidation and reduced commitment to and from existing customers of sold 
division, which in turn might create growth opportunities for the others. Therefore, the 
field could benefit from research that uncovers when and how divestiture modes create 
market opportunities for, and alter capabilities of, remaining firms.  
Another issue concerns organizational resources and relates to the firm ownership of 
these properties. Traditional thinking has implicitly accepted that a firm owns the 
resources on which bases its strategy. However, in practise that has not always been the 
case, with some organization exerting the control over such properties not claiming a 
strong direct ownership over them (Dyer and Singh, 1998). Yet, few studies have 
examined how paired-firm resources characteristics can drive divesting entity decision. 
Through a dyadic approach future research should question how resource similarity and 
complementary might influence divestiture mode attitude to create value. Along this 
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vein, more work is also needed to evaluate intangibles resources. Specifically, the 
method applied to value the human capital inside an organization is still unclear. Future 
research should determine how to value tacit knowledge, skills and competencies held 
by the divested unit. Since divestiture modes account for different post-deal relationship 
with the   parent   firm,   a   better   understanding   of   this   critical   issue   might   affect   firms’  
decisions among divestiture options. Moreover, from this perspective, another important 
topic for future research is the role of conduits. These are meant as mechanisms through 
which experience flows from one party to another. Several studies have examined 
indirect learning through such conduits (Beckman & Haunschild, 2002; Westphal et al., 
2001). Most of these have focused on the role that board interlocks play, which 
typically entails that the focal firm learns from firms in other industries, since rivals in 
the same industry, for self-explanatory reasons, tend not to have board interlocks. An 
interesting question for future research, therefore, may be how alternative divestiture 
modes let the establishment of conduits for tapping into the experience of other firms in 
the same industry. 
In sum, although there are many influences on divestiture decisions and outcomes, 
we still have to clearly determine the relative importance of each of these factors on 
divestiture mode alternatives. Moreover, there is much to learn regarding under what 
condition particular factors have greater effects than others. Although there is merit in 
continuing to search for factors that drive divestiture activity, or lead to superior 
performance, we argue that it is also important to more deeply assess the merits 
according to alternative divestiture modes.  
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ABSTRACT  
This paper explores whether and how governance linkages between parent firms and 
divested units may affect unit underpricing. Focusing on board of directors composition 
it offers support to demonstrate that the subjectivity of board characteristics might affect 
the underpricing of divested firm. Applying information economy arguments, it presents 
sound results of an empirical study of the impact of overlapping directors on 
underpricing of divested firm. We further propose that board structure is not uniform in 
its effects on the underpricing of divested firms, but rather varies across the percentage 
of capital stake divested by parent firm on the stock market. Results are grounded on 
data collected from 141 US equity carve outs and suggest that overlapping directors 
have a positive effect on underpricing of divested firms. However, an opposite selective 
response of investors for divested firms with a high proportion of overlapping directors 
is observed.          
Keywords: divestiture, equity carve out, corporate governance, overlapping directors, 
underpricing.                           
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INTRODUCTION 
 
While tradition wisdom claims that companies experience divestiture to let go 
independent unit, evidence seems to suggest the opposite (Semadeni and Cannella, 
2011; Moschieri and Mair, 2011). Withal, the attractiveness of the observed parent 
retained relationship with divested unit as research object is largely due to their twofold 
implications: the creation of newly independent firms that strive on the market with 
their own identities to which parents have delegated authority still keeping contractual 
relationships   (Moschieri,   2011).   Surprisingly,   even   if   it’s   far-back that studies have 
strongly stated that association with parent firms affects divested units performance (Ito 
and Rose, 1994), only recently an early effort has been made to understand how the 
post-deal   governance   linkage   with   parent   firms   can   affect   the   units’   valuation  
(Semademi and Cannella, 2011).  
Building on the general axiom that corporate actions are not performed in isolation, 
scholars have generally touted the benefits of linkages for organizations (Burt, 1992; 
Podolny   and   Baron,   1997).   However,   linkages   don’t   necessarily   lead   to   positive  
outcomes since the effects of ties might vary upon the situation (Benassi and Gargiulo, 
1999). Understanding whether, how and what factors might influence the effects of 
linkages for divested unit is an important undertaking, helping to grasp how to better 
cast the operation varying market conditions.  
 This study aims to address this issue reconciling the previously mentioned 
corporate evidence: parent firm formally divests a unit keeping a governance linkage 
with it. The ideal room to develop our predictions entails divestiture operations through 
which a unit is hived off to sell a minority stake on the stock exchange. These 
operations are generally identified in the finance literature as equity carve outs. 
 44 
The governance linkage is established through a majority of share holding. However, 
this might be even stronger for the presence of overlapping directors. We define 
overlapping directors as those ones employed by the parent firm at the time the 
divestiture is undergone (Baysinger and Butler, 1985; Cashen, 2008). 
Agreement exists  among  scholars  on  the  directors’ ability to affect a firm operating 
performance through their actions and activities (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Studies 
have stated that the characteristics of directors affecting the organizational legitimacy 
influence the market performance too (Certo, 2003).  
Specifically, a number of governance related signals have demonstrated to affect 
firm value reducing the magnitude of underpricing (McBain and Krause, 1989; 
Mikkelson et al., 1997). This represents the unretained wealth for the initial 
shareholders who sell their equity due to information asymmetry (Certo et al., 2001; 
Daily et al., 2003) and agency concerns (Beatty and Zajac, 1994) arising with new 
investors. However, in the debate about the aforementioned relationships no study has 
still questioned whether and to what extent the presence of overlapping directors can 
affect the foreseen effects. To achieve this aim the following research questions will be 
addressed: How do overlapping directors affect divestiture underpricing? How does the 
percentage of capital divested by the parent firm moderate this effect? 
Indeed, for divested firms a particular effect is determined by the new board 
structure required. Being endogenous by nature to the parent divestiture strategy, the 
board structure might entail equivocal signals on the viability of the established 
governance linkage to markets. These might foresee positive as well as negative effects: 
on the one hand, the presence of overlapping directors signals the organizational 
legitimacy (Certo et al., 2001) of the divested firm to the market, affecting the 
perception of investors on its worthy value.  On the other hand, the perception of 
potential cross-subsidization is higher. In particular, since parent firm and public 
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investors might have incongruent goals, with the occurrence of overlapping directors 
minority  owners’  interests  might  be  disregarded  (Dharwadkar  et  al.,  2000;;  Young  et  al.,  
2008). 
Zooming out this study, we propose that board structure is not uniform in its effects 
on the underpricing of divested firms, but rather varies across the percentage of 
overlapping directors as well as the capital stake divested by parent firm on the stock 
market. Together, these two dimensions form the grounding of our exploration into the 
subjectivity  of  directors’ characteristics and market valuation. Recalling Samademi and 
Cannella’s   (2011)   arguments   we   employ   the   percentage   of   capital   stake   divested   as 
moderator  of  overlapping  directors’ effects. Our argument is that the signalling potential 
of overlapping directors will be moderated by the stake of capital divested by the parent 
such that the information flow associated to the signal will matter more or less under 
specific conditions. To deepen these considerations the following research question will 
be addressed:  How does the percentage of capital divested by the parent firm moderate 
the foreseen relationship between overlapping directors and divestiture underpricing?  
This paper aims to contribute to previous research in several ways. First, giving 
support to emerging model that associate the overall value creation of divestiture to its 
casting.  Since   the  parent   firm  can  plan  out   the  divested  unit’s  governance  structure   to  
frame the parent-unit linkage, it plays a central role in the divested unit performance. 
Second, providing a contribution to information economy research in gaining an 
understanding of how market investors incorporate nonfinancial information in their 
decision making process. Specifically, it offers support to demonstrate that the 
subjectivity   of   directors’ characteristics might affect the firm market legitimization. 
Third, suggesting that magnitude of overlapping directors affects board propensity to 
engage in suboptimal cross-subsidization. Actually, it sheds light on a neglected agency 
issue identifying conditions in which the monitoring commitment of directors might fail 
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to create or even destroy wealth for the divested firm recognizing support to operational 
transaction intended to favour the parent firm.    
BACKGROUND AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
A noteworthy attention has been paid thus far by scholars to divestiture operations 
as events and thus far a general thrust has strongly stated that a link with the parent 
affects divested firm performance (Ito and Rose, 1994). However, little is still known 
about how characteristics of the newly established linkages between the parent and 
divested firm might affect the operation performance (Moschieri and Mair, 2011).  
Studies have brought to attention that increasingly often business segments are 
separated from the parent company and a minority stake is remised to the new investors 
(Semadeni and Cannella, 2011). The parent company thus retains control over the 
subsidiary, while simultaneously creating more transparency for capital markets, 
restructuring its investment portfolio and creating the option to either reintegrate or 
completely sell off subsidiary at a later stage. Although similarities with initial public 
offerings, these divestiture operations, defined in the finance literature as equity carve 
outs are fundamentally  different  with  respect  to  the  stage  of  the  firms’  life  cycle  and  the  
level of information available to investors. Firms that were once part of publicly traded 
firms are involved, thus since information are continually supplied to the capital 
markets, there exists less information asymmetry concerns to justify the underpricing in 
early trading.  
The underpricing is measured as the difference between the per share offer price and 
the closing price on the first day of trading, expressed as a percentage of the offer price 
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(Ritter, 1987; Ritter and Welch, 2002). This  “represents both wealth creation for first-
day investors … and  unretained  wealth  for  the  initial  shareholders” (Certo et al., 2001). 
Basic assumption is that the likelihood of underpricing is higher for issuing firms that 
face greater ex ante uncertainty about the quality of the offering (Rock, 1986). Indeed, 
one of the main issues for firms undergoing a listing is the resolution of information 
asymmetry problems. Since issuing firms are more informed about their effective value 
(Keasey and Short, 1997), the challenge is to demonstrate it so that the initial owners 
may maximize the price at which they can sell the shares. 
As already stated, in the listing of divested divisions investors have more 
information about the unit going public: before the divestiture, being completely 
controlled by the parent its financial statements were consolidated in the parent balance 
sheet. Even after the divestiture, it still generally files consolidated financial statements 
since the parent does not relinquish control of the subsidiary keeping a majority of its 
total outstanding shares. However, as argued by Hogan and Olson (2006), a residual 
information asymmetry concern remains. 
Consistent with signalling theory, in order to communicate high quality, listing 
divisions may seek mechanisms to allow participants in the transaction to effectively 
utilize the signal. Specifically, high-quality applicants are willing to prove their value 
employing signals fulfilling two important criteria: the signal has to be observable and 
costly to imitate (Ross, 1977). Recently a growing attention has started to be paid 
specifically to board of directors (Certo et al., 2001; Filatotchev and Bishop, 2002; 
Certo, 2003; Cohen and Dean, 2005). “Boards structures represent important 
nonfinancial information that investors   consider   when   making   investment   decisions” 
(Certo, 2003). Deeming the board of directors as a compelling signalling device 
satisfies the two mentioned key criteria. Firstly, the board composition is observable 
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and known in advance of the actual offering because the information is reported in the 
prospectus disclosed before the listing. Secondly, the board composition may also 
represent a difficult and costly signal to replicate.  
In a divestiture context, the potential signalling effects associated to the board of 
composition might be not so foreseeable due the detached nature of the newly listed 
firm. Thus far, a specific factor in  investors’  assessment of divested firm’s  quality  has  
been neglected: the presence of overlapping directors, meant as those ones employed 
also by the parent firm at the time the divestiture is undergone (Baysinger and Butler, 
1985; Cashen, 2008). We know that board of directors can be structured in different 
ways. In a divestiture this represents the means through which the balance between two 
parent key objectives might be obtained. On the one hand to maintain a strategic 
relation with the parent firm, on the other hand to create a strategically independent unit 
(Rose and Ito, 2005). Since boards of directors with different overlapping structures will 
signal to the capital market different motives and incentives, it is reasonable to assume 
that these will affect the underpricing of the divested firm.  
Board legitimacy is crucial for the divested firm as it seeks to present itself as a 
stand-alone public traded entity. Underpricing  represents  money  “left  on  the  table”  for  
the first day buyers. Firm owners have a great incentive to demonstrate the high quality 
of their firm, since they will not be able to recoup this transfer of wealth through 
subsequent market operations. Legitimacy through overlapping directors helps the 
divested firm to overcome information asymmetry problems that will deter investors. 
The symbolic role of an overlapping board structure may be particularly valuable in a 
divesting context affecting the perception of potential investors. The   divested   firms’  
association with their corporate parents decreases their liabilities of market newness 
(Certo, 2003). The relationship established between the parent and the divested firm 
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represents a means through which the former is perceived as an endorsement buffer in 
the independent venturing experience. Strategic management scholars are now 
recognizing that directors can play a strategic role in investors’ decision making process 
(Filatotchev   and   Bishop,   2002).   Indeed,   recent   research   suggests   that   directors’  
experience might represent an additional factor in their evaluation of firm quality (Certo 
et al., 2001). Recalling a resource base view approach, overlapping directors understand 
better the business they have been previously governing than others, and might provide 
the divested firm with a great number of outside links that will enhance the perception 
of market legitimization by investors. In addition, a strong connection between the two 
entities provides confirmation to the rest of the market of the value and worth of the 
newly listed firm. As stated by Mizruchi (1996) “by  appointing  individuals  with  ties  to  
other important organizations, the firm signals to potential investors that it is a 
legitimate   enterprise  worthy  of   support”.  This   seems  even  more   compelling  when   the  
sponsoring entity is the parent one. 
While overlapping directors may be an important signal of firm value for the 
divested firm, the relationship between overlapping intensity, as indicated by the 
percentage of overlapping directors, and performance may be non-linear. There is a 
general agreement on that an intense relationship between the parent and the divested 
firm is beneficial to a limit, beyond which over-embeddedness can have a detrimental 
effect (Krishnaswami and Subramaniam, 1999; Parhankangas and Arenius, 2003). A 
potential for conflicts of interest and litigation arises over interpretation of fiduciary 
norms that apply to a governance structure, where directors have two constituencies. 
Since parent firm and  market investors might have incongruent goals, overlapping 
directors might be induced to disregard the interests of minority owners (Dharwadkar et 
al., 2000; Young et al., 2008). The existing parent-subsidiary relationship determines 
incentives and channels for opportunistic behaviours through intercompany transactions. 
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Parent might benefit from wealth transfer through operational transactions that produce 
an on going diversion of cash flows or assets (Atanasov et al., 2010). Operational 
transactions are meant as business dealings between the parent and the divested firm 
that are not conducted on an arms-length basis and are intended to favour the parent 
firm. Overlapping directors, pursuing parent interest, might prefer to improve the wealth 
at the aggregate level at the expense of the divested firm interest. Given the lack of 
effective control by market forces or legal statuses, the ability to pursue expropriating 
activities is greater in presence of a higher percentage of overlapping directors. In 
practice legal standards are sufficiently lenient, indefinite or unenforceable to allow the 
parent considerable latitude in its subsidiary dealings (Slovin and Sushka, 1997). The 
market entrusts the greater concrete potential of cross-subsidization that might lead to 
detrimental inefficiencies for the divested firm due to the greater relative voting weight 
associated to overlapping directors. Being aware of the risks that corporate decisions 
reflect judgments about maximizing total firms value, market investors will price the 
new stocks to lower valuations (Bruton et al., 2010), or otherwise stated they will lead 
to a higher underpricing. Therefore, we argue that the presence of overlapping directors 
represents an important signalling factor that can reduce or amplify information 
asymmetry concerns, and as a consequence can affect the underpricing of the divested 
firm.  
Hypothesis 1: There is a U-shaped relationship between the percentage of 
overlapping directors and the underpricing of the divested firm  
The arguments presented above on the effect of overlapping directors endorsement 
on divested firm success take on that the foreseen effect is uniform at all times. 
However, this might not always be the case. As explained, the presence of overlapping 
directors  affects   the  market   investors’  expectation  on   the  value  of   the  new  firm  at   the  
time of the listing. Since this kind of ties reduces the uncertainty concerning the value 
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of the divested firm, the strength of the signal provided will vary depending upon post 
listing differences in parental divestiture. Specifically, in addition to the direct effect 
that the percentage of overlapping directors has on underpricing, we suggest that the 
effect is moderated by the percentage of capital stake divested by the parent firm. In 
other words, the percentage of capital divested by the parent sends a signal to investors 
about the divested firm value at the time of its listing (Semademi and Cannella, 2011). 
Market investors know that parent firm has private information about the strengths and 
prospects of the divested firm. Therefore, the parent will not wish to sell a great 
ownership stake to the market since it could yield returns when the retained ownership 
will be ultimately appreciated.   
 
Hypothesis 2: The percentage of capital divested by parent firm 
negatively moderates the U-shaped relationship between the percentage of 
overlapping directors and the underpricing of the divested firm. 
 
 
 
METHODS 
Data and sample selection 
The ideal room to test our predictions entails divestiture operations through which a 
unit is hived off to sell a minority stake on the stock exchange. These operations are 
generally identified in the finance literature as equity carve outs (Nanda, 1991). We 
follow Hand and Skantz (1999) to extract these operations, labelled in the finance 
literature as equity carve outs, from   Thomson   Financial’s Security Data Company 
(SDC) database. After excluding unit offers, right issues, close-end funds among which 
REIT, partnerships, foreign issuers, ADRs, and financial institutions (SIC code 6000 – 
6999), our search yielded 416 completed carve outs offered between 1996 and 2009. 
We then exclude misclassifications where parents sold 100% of their holdings in the 
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subsidiaries, issues where the parent and the subsidiary are identical, tracking offers, 
and firms whose parent firms are not publicly traded or not traded on the US stock 
markets. Our final sample consists of 141 equity carve outs. 
Offer characteristics such as offer size, filing date, offer date, the fraction of the 
subsidiary owned by its parent prior to and after the listing are from SDC. Stock prices 
and coverage in the COMPUSTAT database is used to report financial characteristics of 
the firms. To ensure that the data are accurate and provide ownership figures for firms 
missing information from SDC, we consult proxy statements and prospectuses. We also 
examine SEC 10-K forms, prospectuses and proxy statements of both the parent firm 
and the subsidiary collected through EDGAR database to determine ECO and parent 
board of directors composition.  
 
Dependent variable 
We use underpricing as performance indicator of divested firms. When a firm is 
underpriced, it experiences high initial returns. Accordingly, Underpricing is obtained 
by  the  offer  price  and  the  closing  price  of  the  first  day  of  public  trading  for  each  firm’s  
stock. The Underpricing is calculated as: (P1 – P0)/ P0, where P1 equals the closing price 
on the first day of trading and P0 represents   the   initial   offer   price   of   the   firm’s   stock  
(Certo et al., 2001). The offer and closing price data where collected from the 
prospectus filings and from Thomson Reuters Datastream database.  
 
Independent variable 
Overlapping directors has been measured as the proportion of overlapping directors 
to the parent firm. These are classified as having parent firm overlap if they are 
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employed also by the parent firm at the time the divestiture is undergone (Baysinger and 
Butler, 1985; Cashen, 2008). The variable Board_Overlap is expressed as a ratio of 
overlapping directors to total board directors.  
A second key variable in the analysis measures the percentage of capital listed by 
the parent firm. It has been calculated as the difference between the parent initial stake 
of ownership in the division and the post divestiture retained one as indicated in the 
prospectus for each firm. Therefore, the variable Ownership_listed represents the 
percentage of ownership divested by the parent through the divestiture. 
 
Control variables 
To   account   for   other   systematic   determinants   of   a   new   firm’s   market   valuation,  
several control variables have been included in our regression models. These variables 
comprise divested frm size (Size), divested firm profitability (ROI), parent retained 
equity (Post_Ownership), divested firm relatedness (Relatedness), divested firm risk 
(Risk), divested firm leverage (Leverage). A full set of year dummy variables have been 
considered to control for time effects.  
First, we accounted for the possible effects of the divested firm size and profitability 
based on the reported relationship with listing market valuation (Megginson and Weiss, 
1991; Mikkelson et al., 1997). These have been measured as the logarithm of the 
divested firm total assets and subsidiary return on investments at the year prior to the 
deals severally.   
We controlled for parental retained equity since parent firm might have information 
that is unavailable to outsiders concerning the true value of the divested firm. Relevant 
changes in parent ownership can therefore signal divested firm performance potential. 
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Post_Ownership is measured as the percentage of equity retained by the parent firm, as 
reported in the prospectus (Hogan and Olson, 2006). 
Relatedness is included since information asymmetry concerns might be stronger for 
firms unrelated to the parent (Chemmanur and Paeglis, 2001). Relatedness is computed 
comparing the divested firm primary business and the parent core business (at the 2-
digit SIC level), and is represented by a dummy variable, coded 1 for related units and 0 
for unrelated units (Bergh, 1995). 
Anecdotal evidence suggests the risk level of the divested firm business may also 
affect the market valuation. Therefore, a high-technology dummy variable is equal to 
one if the firm is from the information technology and software sectors. Loughran and 
Ritter (2004) and Cliff et al. (2004) categorize firms with the following SIC codes as 
high-tech firms: 2833, 2834, 2835, 2836, 3571, 3572, 3575, 3577, 3578, 3661, 3663, 
3669, 3674, 3812, 3823, 3825, 3826, 2827, 3829, 3841, 3845, 4812, 4813, 4899, 7370, 
7371, 7372, 7373, 7374, 7375, 7377, 7378,7379. 
We also used a control for divested firm leverage since a large pre-listing leverage 
serves  as  a  credible  signal  of  firm’s  quality  because  debt  (with  the  threat  of  bankruptcy)  
imposes a hard budget constraint on managers, limits management  control  over  firm’s  
cash flows (Ross, 1977; Heinkel and Zechner, 1990). Leverage is computed as long-
term debt over market value of equity (Su, 2004).    
RESULTS 
 
The descriptive statistics and correlations of variables used in this study are reported 
in Table 1. In terms of the general characteristics of firms in our sample the average 
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firm size and profitability clearly indicate that our firms are relatively small and 
performing. A high level of leveraged is shown on average and approximately 50% of 
the sample undergoing the listing process results related to the parent core business, 
with firms from the information technology sector accounting for 30 per cent of the 
sample. With regard to governance structure, the average percentage of equity retained 
by the parent firm is 53 per cent, which is consistent with results reported in other 
studies (Pojezny et al., 2006), and the average percentage of ownership listed is 30 per 
cent. In terms of board composition, our analysis shows that overlapping directors on 
average represent 21 per cent of the total board members. Finally, according to Table 1, 
the average level of underpricing is 3 percent, which result in line with previous 
findings (Benveniste et al., 2008). None of the correlation coefficients raises potential 
problems of multi-collinearity. 
 
--- INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE --- 
 
The results of our regression analyses are reported in Table 2. Model 1 of Table 2 
reports the control variables for the IPO valuation estimates. Firm profitability is 
negatively associated with market valuation, while the relatedness with parent core 
business is positively associated to it. The baseline model explains 19% of the variance. 
The independent variable was added in Model 2 to test whether there was a significant 
effect on divested firm underpricing. The coefficient was positive and statistically 
significant (p < 0.001). Model 3 investigates whether the overlapping directors have a 
U-shaped effect on divested firm underpricing. The explained variance increases to 40%. 
Results are consistent with our hypothesis 1. Specifically, both overlapping coefficients 
are considered with the linear effect being negative and statistically significant (p < 
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0.05) and the quadratic effect being positive and statistically significant (p < 0.001) 
confirming our predictions. The effects remain stable across the remaining 
specifications. In Model 4 the interactions between the overlapping directors and the 
percentage of capital divested by the parent have been added to test hypothesis 2. The 
model explains 60% of the variance. The estimation shows that the interaction with the 
linear term of overlapping directors is positive and statistically significant (p < 0.01). 
The interaction with the quadratic term is negative and statistically significant (p < 0.01). 
This result lends support to our predictions.  
 
--- INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE --- 
 
The interaction results have been depicted in Figure 11. Figure 1 shows that the 
overall shape of the curve changes with the level of capital divested by the parent given 
the significance of the interaction term with the quadratic effect. Because of the 
quadratic interaction, the curves are not parallel. Indeed, since the interaction involves 
not only first order terms, the curves are not identical in shape. Specifically, for any 
level of overlapping directors, the curve with lower percentage of ownership listed is 
mildly more concave upward compared the mean one. A gentle convexity is instead 
observed for high level of ownership listed. This shows that the quadratic relationship 
between overlapping directors and divested firm underpricing varies in form as a 
function of the value of the percentage of capital divested by the parent. 
 
--- INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE --- 
                                                         
1 High and low were defined as 1 standard deviation above and below the mean value of the percentage of 
capital divested by the parent 
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
The present study examines the relationship between divested firm underpricing and 
wealth and states that the wealth assessment during the first day of trading is a function 
of the board of directors composition. The observed effect might be explained through 
several   finance   literature’s   theoretical  arguments on underpricing (Baron, 1982; Rock, 
1986). Actually, it is inferred that information asymmetry concern of market investors 
represents a root cause of the tested relationship between board composition and 
underpricing in that the market will attach different value to overlapping directors. The 
rationale of such effect is supported by the argument that market investors suffer from a 
bias   against   risk   and   don’t   appreciate   initial   offerings   of   firms  with   an   opaque   value  
(Prasad et al., 1995). To support the discussion it is necessary to consider the possible 
effect of overlapping directors to the firm capacity to create wealth. It seems plausible 
that positive legitimization effects will accrue to divested firms with overlapping 
directors. Actually, such effects portend the possibility of future wealth creation by the 
firm. Ironically, while capital markets show an initial favour for overlapping directors, 
above a certain level of overlap they become skeptical about the directors capacity to 
add value to the firm. This is because a high probability of expropriation detrimental for 
minority shareholders is foreseen due to a multi agency concern that arises on the 
directors.  
The observations mentioned above collectively suggest that board characteristics in 
a divested firm represent a neglected area of research. Our analysis gives support to the 
belief   that   the   market   investors’   valuation   is   partially   a   function   of   the   perceived  
legitimization of the governance arrangements. It suggests that the first day investors’  
perceive the firm quality employing nonfinancial information. The current study 
demonstrates that directors might affect wealth creation in a way that has been wholly 
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overlooked before. Specifically, a high proportion of overlapping directors reduces the 
legitimization advantages to the extent of underpricing of the share issue. Our findings 
are consistent with the notion that up to a certain level this governance factor may be 
strategically used to attract the market investors during the initial floatation. However, 
at   high   level   it   entails   the   risk   that   investors’   selectivity   of   board   characteristics  
perceives the strong link with the parent firm as a means through which detrimental 
cross-subsidizations are assured. Our results also suggest that an increasing percentage 
of divested capital by parent firm blunts the signalling effect of overlapping directors on 
the underpricing of divested firm. These findings are consistent with information 
asymmetry arguments according to which a parent will divest a lower stake if it expects 
the divested firm performance to increase having information not publicly known. By 
doing so, it will obtain a premium if the divested firm stock will appreciate subsequent 
to the operation. 
The preceding findings should be esteemed in light of some noteworthy limitations. 
First, the possibility to generalize this study on the likely performance implications of 
board composition is limited and should be made with caution. This is because we 
operationalized the unretained wealth as underpricing, that is a highly context-specific 
performance variable.  Moreover, the underpricing was assessed over a one-day period, 
reckoned appropriate for IPO considerations (Bruton and Prasad, 1997), but no 
inference can be made for long-term wealth effects from such initial observed returns.  
Second, we examined market sorting only for US divested firms. Our results may not be 
extended to all contexts. Further research is needed to determine whether market 
evaluations based on secondary qualitative indicators is equally efficacious across 
countries. We expect corporate governance attributes will be valuable signals, and that 
they are even more valuable when underlying economic indicators are poorly 
understood. Finally, another charming area for future research might involve the 
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exploration of the potential wealth-related implications of other board variables, such as 
demographic characteristics.  
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TABLE 1 
 
Sample descriptive statistics and correlation matrix2    
 
   2 * (p<.05); n=141     
 Mean SD Min Max 1. 2. 3. 4. 5 6. 
 
7. 8. 9. 
1. Underpricing 0.03 0.02 -0.04 0.08 1.00         
2. Board_Overlap 0.21 0.19 0.00 0.80 0.36* 1.00        
3. Ownership_listed 0.30 0.21 0.07 0.83 0.52* 0.15 1.00       
4. Relatedness 0.52 0.50 0.00 1.00 0.22* 0.40* 0.19* 1.00      
5. ROI 0.08 0.04 -0.07 0.29 -0.20* 0.04 -0.09 -0.06 1.00     
6. Post_Ownership  0.53 0.19 0.06 0.86 -0.07 0.08 -0.45* -0.04 0.12 1.00    
7. Leverage 115.99 65.80 0.94 416.51 0.08 -0.13 0.09 -0.01 0.01 -0.07 1.00   
8. Size 12.95 2.38 5.07 18.58 0.06 0.04 0.01 -0.09 0.04 0.05 0.16 1.00  
9. Risk 0.31 0.46 0.00 1.00 -0.06 -0.11 0.06 -0.27* 0.01 0.06 0.05 -0.01 1.00 
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TABLE 2 
 
 
      
      †p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001; standard errors in parentheses. 
          a Dummy variables for year are included in the analysis but not shown to preserve space.  
 
 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Underpricing 
OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Board_Overlap  
0.05*** 
(0.01) 
-0.05* 
(0.02) 
-0.16*** 
(0.04) 
Board_Overlap^Sqrd  
 
 
0.21*** 
(0.05) 
0.39*** 
(0.09) 
Ownership_listed    
0.04** 
(0.01) 
Board_Overlap* Ownership_listed    
0.33** 
(0.11) 
Board_Overlap^Sqrd* 
Ownership_listed    
-0.64** 
(0.23) 
Relatedness 
0.01* 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
ROI 
-0.12** 
(0.05) 
-0.12** 
(0.04) 
-0.09* 
(0.04) 
-0.07* 
(0.03) 
Post_Ownership 
-0.00 
(0.01) 
-0.00 
(0.01) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
0.03** 
(0.01) 
Leverage 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
Size 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
Risk 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
Year Dummies Incl.a Incl.a Incl.a Incl.a 
Const 
0.00 
(0.02) 
0.00 
(0.01) 
0.00 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
Observations 141 141 141 141 
R-Squared 0.19 0.29 0.40 0.60 
F-statistic 1.56 2.57 3.78 7.31 
Prob (F-statistic) † *** *** *** 
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FIGURE 1 
 
Underpricing and Overlapping Board Directors for different levels of Ownership 
Listed 
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ABSTRACT 
 
From a corporate governance perspective, this paper examines interlinks between board 
of directors composition and parent stock market reaction to equity carve out 
announcement. Uncertainty regarding subsequent parent strategies and lack of codified 
interrelation data between parent and subsidiary present market investors with equivocal 
guidance about parent gains. Using a sample of 141 US equity carve outs, we argue that 
the presence of overlapping directors provides investors with a stronger and clearer 
outlook about parent strategic venue. Results show that market investors reward those 
firms that grant clarification through board indicators. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
An equity carve out (ECO) is an event through which a parent firm makes a 
subsidiary go public by selling a part of its ownership in the subsidiary. Scholars, 
regarding at ECOs as corporate restructuring strategies, shows that carve outs bring a 
positive stock market reaction to the parent firm (Schipper and Smith, 1986). However 
compared to other divestiture modes (i.e. sell offs and spin offs) lower abnormal returns 
are observed (Vijh, 2002) and surprisingly, little is known as to what drives these 
differences.  
Strictly   speaking,   ECOs   may   not   be   considered   as   “conventional”   divestiture  
operations due to two main reasons. First, the parent firm usually retains the majority 
ownership in the subsidiary and establishes long-term financial and product-market 
relations with it (Boone, 2003). These links might affect the performance of the parent 
firm given the strong interrelation between the cash flows of the two entities. Second, 
evidence demonstrates that ECOs are transitory arrangements (Klein et al., 1991; 
Schipper and Smith, 1986): most parent evaluate in a later time the choice of whether to 
further divest, stop mid-way, or regain control over the business unit (Zingales, 1995; 
Perotti and Rossetto, 2007).  
Underlying effect of these factors is that at the ECO announcement investors receive 
noisy information flows concerning the potential divestiture gains due to the perceived 
uncertainty associated to subsequent events (Desai and Savickas, 2010). Investors are 
less aware of the effective future gains for the parent associated to the announcement; 
therefore an information asymmetry concern rises (Otsubo, 2009). 
Since scholars argue firms consider their governance arrangements as part of their 
corporate strategy (Moschieri, 2008), our study aims to question whether these might 
represent valuable signals to provide investors with a stronger and clearer outlook about 
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parent strategic future. Specifically, market investors critically view and value clarity of 
strategic direction (Filatotchev and Bishop, 2002). Overlapping board directors, meant 
as those ones employed also by the parent firm at the time the equity carve out is 
undergone (Baysinger and Butler, 1985; Cashen, 2009), may represent a superior signal 
providing a venue where strategic ambiguity may be reduced. To investigate this aspect, 
the present work will address the following research question: How do overlapping 
directors affect to divesting firm value creation? 
In  divestiture  context,  previous  researches  have  implicitly  viewed  board  of  directors’  
contributions to wealth creation as mainly explaining the result of their involvement in 
the implementation process (Moschieri, 2006). The aim of this study is to extend the 
role of board of directors as a catalyst for parent wealth creation. We expect board 
composition  to  influence  investors’  perception  of  the  firm  divestiture  gains  acting  as  a  
valid signal of its guidance about the future, since investors when unable to discern 
economic disclosure of value, turn to more social indicators of it (Podonly, 1994). 
The present research focusing on the relationship between stock market reaction to 
ECO announcement and its board composition contributes to the growing body of 
knowledge concerning the divestiture performance-related effects of governance 
arrangements (Moschieri and Mair, 2010). As detailed in subsequent sections there are 
sound reasons for assuming that the presence of overlapping board directors may affect 
parent stock market reaction to ECO announcement. Gaining a better understanding of 
the phenomenon is important because it would further delineate how parent-unit 
governance relationship grants the divesting company to value creation. 
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BACKGROUND AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
An equity carve out is experienced when a firm divests a business division issuing a 
portion of its equity shares to the market as an independent company (Schipper and 
Smith, 1986). The sale of the subsidiary’s   stock   in   the   IPO   might   consist   of   either  
claims previously owned by the parent, new issued shares or both. Management 
literature,   wondering   “how”   the   choice   to   divest   through an equity carve out creates 
value, shows equity carve outs are complex operations with a number of possible 
factors driving the outcome of the transactions. Previous research has established that 
announcement of intended equity carve outs on average leads to positive abnormal 
returns. Two sets of explanations are offered, namely the divestiture gains hypothesis 
and the information asymmetry hypothesis.  
According to the divestiture gains hypothesis, value arises because the business 
focus of both parent and subsidiary firm increases following the equity carve out, cash 
proceeds can be used to retire debt, the carved-out entity is able to finance its projects, 
managers’  contracts  can  be  designed  more  efficiently  and  investors  are  more  inclined  to  
invest into the new pure-play stock (Schipper and Smith, 1986; Aron, 1991; Vijh, 2002). 
According to the information asymmetry hypothesis, issuing share in the subsidiary 
firm signals an undervaluation of the larger parent firm assets and an overvaluation of 
the smaller subsidiary firm assets. Investors use this information and buy shares in the 
parent firm, leading to positive returns (Nanda, 1991; Slovin et al., 1995).  
However,   those   explanations   account   for   equity   carve   out   as   “one   shot   game”  
neglecting   two   pieces   of   evidence   that   don’t   let   to   consider   it   as   a   “conventional”  
divestiture operation. First, a strong parent–subsidiary relationship is preserved after a 
carve-out. This represents a way for parent to float only a stake of a subsidiary, while 
still retaining control over it (Schipper and Smith, 1986). Evidence suggests the parent 
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firm generally establishes long-term financial and product-market relations with the 
subsidiary. Literature argues that parent have the possibility to embezzle private 
benefits of control, since it might affect the outcome of intercompany transactions 
(Boone, 2003). These entail business dealings not conducted on an arms-length basis, as 
a means to manage wealth transfer between two entities. Generally speaking, the parent 
might acquire benefits without harming the minority owners; however, the advantages it 
stands to realize from self-dealing transactions are usually associated with the diversion 
of wealth to detriment of other investors. Actually, there might be factors in play that 
mitigate   expropriation   incentives.   “If   a   parent   intends   to   sell   the   subsidiary, it might 
attempt   to   improve,   or   prop,   the   subsidiary’s   performance”   (Atanassov   et   al.,   2010).  
Therefore, propping might be preferable to expropriating accounting for divestiture as a 
long-time process.  
This introduces the second piece of evidence. Most carve-out firms conduct 
secondary events that affect the parent-subsidiary relationships (Klein et al., 1991). 
Since the full value of a business unit may not be realized under conditions of 
uncertainty, by choosing equity carve outs, parent firms may benefit from the access to 
additional information  in  the  subsidiary  industries’  and  adjust  the  divestiture strategy as 
information arrives. According to the situation evolution, the subsidiary can be further 
divested  at  a  better  price,  or  brought  back  into  the  parent’s  fold  more  easily  as  opposed  
to sell offs. However, in any cases again the parent firm will have the possibility to 
choose a course of action that best fits its strategic requirements (Perotti and Rossetto, 
2007; Damaraju, 2008). Otsubo (2009) finds evidence that stock market expects 
secondary events, and upon the announcement of equity carve outs it evaluates the gains 
from the combined events as a whole.   
As a result, the information flow conveyed at the operation announcement provides 
market with a little guidance about the parent gain, which makes the effect of these less 
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informed investors on market stock reaction less pronounced. Indeed, an information 
asymmetry problem arises since investors are less aware of the effective divestiture 
gains, strictly depending on the subsequent series of actions. Therefore, investors have 
to face a greater information uncertainty when a carve out occurs, compared to the 
informational content generally associated to divestiture events.  
Given the opaqueness and uncertain nature of their prior information set, market 
investors will perceive great news content in information flow inferred by additional 
signals. Indeed, uncertainty might be reduced if markets have access to alternative types 
of data (Spence, 1974), which help foresee the subsequent strategic actions. Thus, with 
high level of uncertainty market investors are likely to shift their attention from 
financial and operating data, which are not well understood, to secondary information 
sources. Corporate governance represents a type of secondary indicator that conveys to 
investors valuable information about not detected actions (Sanders and Boivie, 2004). 
Indeed, signalling theory suggests that firm characteristics contain information that 
reduces  investors’  uncertainty.  Because  investors  will  rely  on  signals  that  they  perceive  
as credible and disregard those ones deemed suspicious, board of directors 
characteristics have started receiving a growing attention from the academic community 
as a signalling device being consistent with the two key criteria: observable in advance 
and difficult to imitate.  
Much   prior   research   argues   that   directors’   characteristics   may   affect   firm  market  
legitimacy  since  investors  turn  to  “social”  indicators  when  unable  to  discern  economic  
disclosure. In equity carve outs this assumption is more compelling entailing two 
interlinked issues. First, directors might be not independently affiliated with only one 
party of the operation: often, the divesting and the divested firms have some 
overlapping directors who at the same time seat in both boards. Second, overlapping 
and non-overlapping directors might have heterogeneous signalling effects providing a 
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clearer outlook about parent strategic plans. In strategic management research there is 
the recognition that directors play strategic roles in addition to the traditional control 
function, especially when firms face a high level of uncertainty (Pearce and Zahra, 
1991). Overlapping directors reduce the strategic ambiguity associated to the operation 
shading light on its rationale. Their coinciding presence in both boards suggests to 
investors the planned objective of concerted strategic management. Since market 
investors critically view and value clarity of strategic directions, the presence of 
overlapping directors, as expression of the foreseen bundling management, might 
reduce   investors’   uncertainty   and   affect   their   reaction   to   the   equity   carve   out  
announcement. 
 
Hypothesis: A positive relationship exists between the percentage of overlapping 
directors and stock market reaction to equity carve out announcement.  
 
 
METHODS 
 
Data and sample selection 
Testing our hypothesis, a working sample of equity carve outs is required. We 
follow  Hand  and  Skantz  (1999)  to  extract  equity  carve  outs  from  Thomson  Financial’s  
Security Data Company (SDC) database. After excluding unit offers, right issues, close-
end funds among which REIT, partnerships, foreign issuers, ADRs, and financial 
institutions (SIC code 6000 – 6999), our search yielded 416 completed carve out IPOs 
offered between 1996 and 2009. We then exclude misclassifications where parents sold 
100% of their holdings in the subsidiaries, issues where the parent and the subsidiary 
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are identical, tracking offers, and firms whose parent firms are not publicly traded or not 
traded on the US stock markets. Our final sample consists of 141 equity carve outs. 
Operation characteristics such as offer size, filing date, offer date, the fraction of the 
subsidiary owned by its parent prior to and after the equity carve out are from SDC. 
Stock prices and coverage in the COMPUSTAT database is used to report financial 
characteristics of the firms. To ensure that the data are accurate and provide ownership 
figures for firms missing information from SDC, we consult proxy statements and 
prospectuses. We also examine SEC 10-K forms, prospectuses and proxy statements of 
both the parent firm and the subsidiary collected through EDGAR database to determine 
ECO and parent board of directors composition.   
Dependent variable 
Event study methodology is considered as the dominant method for measuring the 
impact of equity carve outs on parent shareholder value (Schipper and Smith, 1986; 
Klein et al., 1991). As outlined by Brown and Warner (1985), cumulative abnormal 
returns are computed (CAR) as the returns over the event window minus the normal 
returns, which represent the expected returns if the event had not taken place (Campbell 
et al., 1997). To calculate CAR, we first obtained abnormal returns (AR) for firm j: 
ARjt= Rjt – E(Rjt) 
The expected returns, E(Rjt), are estimated   by   regressing   the   firm’s   returns to 
market index, corresponding to the MSCI index for each country to control for any 
country-specific effects on returns, for  an  estimation  period  of  200  days  (−250  to  −50)  
before the equity carve out announcement data (Fama et al., 1969; Warner et al., 1988). 
Next, the ARs are accumulated for all operations included in the sample. 
The average cumulative abnormal returns to shareholders of parent firms are 
calculated having concerned different event windows. In particular, the average 2-day 
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cumulative abnormal return (-1; 0) is 2.01% and the average 3-day cumulative abnormal 
return (-1; +1) is 2.01%. These returns are positive and statistically significant, 
consistently with prior studies (Otsubo, 2009). Evidence of a positive announcement 
effect is found also on the 4-day (-2; 0), 5-day (-4; 0), 9-day (-4, +4) cumulative average 
abnormal returns for parent firms announcing equity carve outs.  
Given these results, we employ in our analyses cumulative abnormal returns for 
two-day (-1; 0) and three-day (-1; +1) event windows. The choice has been made to 
capture the significant announcement effect, neglecting other potential baffling ones led 
in a longer event window (McWilliams and Siegel, 1997).  
Independent variable 
ECO board of director overlap is measured in two different ways. A dummy variable 
(Overlap_Dummy), coded 1 for overlapping board and 0 otherwise, represents the first 
one (Loderer, 2002). Proportion of overlapping directors to the parent firm is the second 
one. ECO board are classified as having parent firm overlap if directors are employed 
also by the parent firm at the time the equity carve out is undergone (Baysinger and 
Butler, 1985; Cashen, 2008). The variable Board_Overlap is expressed as a ratio of 
overlapping directors to total board directors. To report the presence of overlapping 
board member we manually conduct a dyadic cross-check between the prospectuses of 
the paired firms involved in the operation.  
Control variables 
To account for other systematic determinants of the stock market reaction to the 
equity carve out announcement, several control variables have been included in our 
regression models. These variables comprise firm size (Size), ECO relative size 
(Relative_Size), parent profitability (ROI), ECO profitability (ECO_ROI), parent 
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retained equity (Post_Ownership), ECO relatedness (Relatedness), firm risk (Risk), firm 
leverage (Leverage), market valuation (M/B). A full set of block-holder’s   identity  
variables is used to control for agency concerns, and year dummy variables are 
considered to control for time effects.  
First, we account for the possible effects of firm size and the ECO relative size 
based on prior studies that have shown market reaction at the announcement of 
corporate restructuring deals is correlated with the relative dollar value of the entities 
involved (Allen and McConnell, 1998). Size is computed as the logarithm of firm total 
assets, whereas Relative_Size is measured by assets of the divested division divided by 
total assets of the parent, defined at the year prior to the event (Bergh, 1995; Chang and 
Singh, 1999). 
Performance measures are included since ECO, as a mode of divestiture, has been 
mainly considered a means to recover corporate efficiency (Vihji, 2002). Parent and 
subsidiary return on investments at the year prior to the deal severally are employed. 
We control for parental retained equity since strong governance mechanisms such as 
large block-holder ownership have been shown to influence favourably divestments 
enhancing monitoring efficacy (Bethel and Liebeskind, 1993; Hoskisson et al., 1994). 
Post_Ownership is measured as the percentage of equity retained by the parent firm, as 
reported in the prospectus (Hogan and Olson, 2006). 
Relatedness is included since information asymmetry concerns might be stronger for 
firms unrelated to the parent (Chemmanur and Paeglis, 2001). Relatedness is computed 
comparing the ECO primary business and the parent core business (at the 2-digit SIC 
level), and is represented by a dummy variable, coded 1 for related units and 0 for 
unrelated units (Bergh, 1995). 
Anecdotal evidence suggests the risk level of the parent business may also affect the 
market valuation. Therefore, a high-technology dummy variable is equal to one if the 
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firm is from the information technology and software sectors. Loughran and Ritter 
(2004) and Cliff and Denis (2004) categorize firms with the following SIC codes as 
high-tech firms: 2833, 2834, 2835, 2836, 3571, 3572, 3575, 3577, 3578, 3661, 3663, 
3669, 3674, 3812, 3823, 3825, 3826, 2827, 3829, 3841, 3845, 4812, 4813, 4899, 7370, 
7371, 7372, 7373, 7374, 7375, 7377, 7378,7379. 
We also use a control for parent leverage since ECOs have been studied as equity 
financing arrangements (Powers, 2003). Leverage is computed as long-term debt over 
market value of equity in the year of the eco and averaged with the 2 years immediately 
prior to it (Chang and Singh, 1999). 
Finally, market valuation of the parent firm is considered since information 
asymmetry represents a central factor that might influence the stock market reaction 
(Schipper and Smith, 1986). M/B is computed as the price at the end of fiscal year 
multiplied by the total outstanding common stock (Villalonga, 2006). 
 
 
RESULTS 
 
The descriptive statistics and correlations of variables used in this study are 
displayed in Table 1. Parents sell an average of 47 percent of their ownership in carve 
out subsidiary, which is consistent with results reported in other studies (Pojezny et al., 
2006). In terms of the general characteristics of firms in our sample the average firm 
size is quite large ($9 billion in assets). At the time of carve outs, mean subsidiary total 
assets as a percentage of total parent assets are 16 percent. The parent average 
profitability is   lower   than   the   subsidiary’s   one.   This   clearly   confirms   that   carve   out  
subsidiaries are typically the high-profitability divisions of the parents (Powers, 2003). 
A high level of parent leverage is shown on average (133.08 percent) confirming the 
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financial tension of firms undergoing the operation. However, values ranged from 58.67 
percent to 286.78 percent. Approximately 50 percent of the carved out sample results 
related to the parent core business, with firms from the information technology sector 
accounting for almost one-third of the sample. With regard to board of director 
composition, our analysis shows that almost 63 percent of our sample presents 
overlapping directors, which account on average 21 percent of the total board members. 
None of the correlation coefficients raises potential problems of multi-collinearity. 
 
--- INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE --- 
 
The results of our OLS estimation are displayed in Table 2. Model 1 of Table 2 
reports the control variables effect on abnormal returns. It reveals that leverage 
coefficient is positive and statistically significant (p < 0.001) to stock market reaction. 
This finding is consistent with Allenn and McConnel (1998). Statistically significant 
coefficients (p < 0.05) are found for Risk and ROI variables too. The coefficient is 
positive for the former and negative for the latter, which is in line with previous studies 
(Chemmanur and Paeglis, 2001). The independent variable Overlap_Dummy is added in 
Model 2 to test whether there is a significant effect of overlapping directors’  presence  
on stock market reaction. The coefficient is positive and statistically significant 
(p<0.001), supporting our Hypothesis. In Model 3 Board_Overlap is introduced. The 
positive and statistically significant coefficient (p<0.001) can be interpreted as an 
additional validation of our Hypothesis. It is worth noting that none of the control shares 
pertaining to different block-holder identities have a significant effect on the CAR. This 
lets  us  assume  that  market   investors  don’t  perceive  specific  agency  concerns  in  equity  
carve outs due to the control exercised by block-holder categories.   
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--- INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE --- 
 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION  
This study examines the relationship between equity carve outs and value creation, 
particularly with regard to whether equity carve out board composition possibly brings 
additional gains. Uncertainty regarding subsequent parent strategies, lack of codified 
interrelation data between parent and subsidiary present market investors with equivocal 
guidance about parent gains. Since market investors have to handle a greater 
information uncertainty when a carve out occurs, compared to the informational flows 
generally associated to alternative divestiture modes, board characteristics serve as a 
secondary indicator of subsequent strategic actions and thereby help market evaluation. 
The findings of this study demonstrate that within one highly uncertain context market 
reaction  is  positively  associated  with  a  particular  directors’  characteristic:  overlapping.  
This   governance   aspect,   visible   to   market   investors’,   suggests   that   parent   firm   has  
provided endorsement as knowledgeable party. This seems to clarify the parent strategic 
directions as signal of bundling strategic outline between the two entities. Markets 
appear to reward those firms that grant such endorsements and clarifications as 
secondary subjective information indicators. Actually, previous studies generally 
suggest that endorsement effects from subjective indicators reduce the uncertainty 
associated with new firms and allow market investors to have more information from 
which to judge the venture (Chaterji, 2009; Higgins and Gulati, 2003). However, our 
results imply that these arguments might be referred not only to new and young firms. 
Even  if  the  signalling  firm  already  has  a  market  track  record,  investors’  valuation  might  
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be affected by directors’   affiliation   in   the   carved   out   subsidiary.   This   is   used   as  
objective information to anticipate the expected parent gains from the equity carve out.   
The findings of this study have several implications for theory and practice. Because 
uncertainty causes investors to discount valuation (Akerlof, 1970), a value enhancing 
strategy might not realize shareholders wealth accretion until information asymmetry is 
reduced. The findings suggest that parent firms can benefit by adopting some board 
attributes that reduce uncertainty. These contribute to corporate governance literature by 
demonstrating  that  directors’  characteristics  represent  proxies  that  affect  firm  valuation  
before any objective effects have materialized. 
The implications of our work for practise are also important. First, we believe the 
composition of board is strategically important for management practice. At its broadest 
sense, our study suggests that parent firms can benefit from directors links with the 
carved out units since purposeful selection of board members who can signal bundling 
strategic management is valuable to a firm.  
There are several limitations of our findings. Even if consistent with theory, our 
evidence may not be considered conclusive. Institutional and social network theories 
would be consistent with our evidence regarding overlapping directors effects. However, 
we considered the logic we used helpful in this initial inquiry and we encourage future 
research employing other theoretical foundations. We suggest research may benefit 
from  deepening  our  early   focus  on  directors’  overlapping   to  also  consider  other  board  
characteristics, such as demographic variables. We hope our result will spur further 
analyses of additional board characteristics because even if ours is an important first 
step,  it  doesn’t  offer  a  complete  understanding  of  the  phenomenon.   
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TABLE 1 
Sample descriptive statistics and correlations1  
   1 *(p < 0.05); n = 141 
 
 Mean SD Min Max 1. 2. 3. 4. 5 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 
1. CAR (-1;0) 0.02 0.01 -0.03 0.07 1.00           
2. Board_Overlap 0.21 0.19 0.00 0.80 0.36 1.00          
3. Size 15.99 3.34 9.03 23.60 -0.17* -0.04 1.00         
4. Post_Ownership 0.53 0.19 0.06 0.19 -0.04 0.08 0.02 1.00        
5. Relatedness 0.52 0.50 0.00 1.00 0.06 0.39 0.02 -0.04 1.00       
6. Relative_Size 0.16 0.18 0.00 0.81 0.09 -0.00 -0.06* -0.12 -0.01 1.00      
7. Risk 0.31 0.46 0.00 1.00 0.08 -0.11 -0.09 0.06 -0.27* 0.15 1.00     
8. M/B 3.45 2.78 0.29 17.12 0.04 -0.07 -0.06 -0.06 -0.02 0.02 -0.13 1.00    
9. ROI_ECO 0.08 0.04 -0.07 0.29 0.12 0.04 -0.03 0.12 -0.06 -0.02 0.01 0.03 1.00   
10. ROI 0.06 0.06 -0.39 0.23 -0.21* -0.18* 0.02 -0.01 0.06 0.01 0.08 0.10 -0.12 1.00  
11. Leverage 133.08 44.91 58.67 286.78 0.36* 0.16 0.03 0.05 0.16 0.08 -0.09 -0.04 -0.02 -0.08 1.00 
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TABLE 2                           
                                  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                     †p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001; standard errors in parentheses. 
                                 a Dummy variables for year are included in the analysis but not shown to preserve space. 
 
 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
CAR(-1;0) OLS OLS OLS 
Overlap_Dummy 
 0.01*** 
(0.00) 
 
 
Board_Overlap 
  
 
0.03*** 
(0.01) 
Size 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
Post_Ownership 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.00) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
Relatedness 
0.00 
(0.00) 
-0.00 
(0.01) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
Relative_Size 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
Risk 
0.01* 
(0.00) 
0.01* 
(0.00) 
0.01* 
(0.00) 
M/B 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
ROI_ECO 
0.01 
(0.03) 
0.00 
(0.03) 
-0.01 
(0.03) 
ROI 
-0.04* 
(0.02) 
-0.03 
(0.02) 
-0.03** 
(0.02) 
Leverage 
0.00*** 
(0.00) 
0.00*** 
(0.00) 
0.00*** 
(0.00) 
Corporate 
-0.00 
(0.01) 
-0.00 
(0.01) 
-0.00 
(0.01) 
Financial 
-0.01 
(0.03) 
-0.00 
(0.03) 
-0.00 
(0.03) 
State 
-0.06 
(0.09) 
-0.05 
(0.08) 
-0.04 
(0.08) 
Individual 
0.01 
(0.03) 
0.00 
(0.02) 
0.00 
(0.03) 
Year Dummies Incl.a Incl.a Incl.a 
Const 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
Observations 141 141 141 
R-Squared 0.38 0.46 0.46 
F-statistic 2.76 3.58 3.51 
Prob (F-statistic) *** *** *** 
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CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
This thesis aims to contribute to the literature that explores divestiture and its effects 
on performance. Scholars have under investigated the divesting process and how the 
structuring of divestiture itself concurs in explaining the divestiture performance (Bergh 
et al., 2008).  
To fill this gap, this project provides a groundbraking model that associate the 
overall value creation of divestiture operations with their casting, disaggregating the 
current knowledge on antecedents and outcomes. In doing so, it expands current 
explanations of divestiture performance, strengthening an emergent grounding that 
future studies may further to build a more complete understanding of divestiture activity.  
Research on this topic has no explicitly investigated how the choice among 
divestiture methods is related to value. In an attempt to deepen this aspect, this 
dissertation offers a theoretical contribution enlightening that selection capability affects 
divestiture performance.  
The right selection of divestiture method impacts the parent ability to deploy 
resources to achieve high yield objectives (Power, 2001; Chen and Guo, 2005). Spin 
offs, sell offs and equity carve outs pursue similar objectives, but at a closer look, they 
handle differently the characteristics of the firms involved.  
These arguments are consistent with recent studies that have pointed up the 
importance of questioning on divestiture mode choice, in recognition that firms should 
not act as passive implementers of divestiture deals.    
What  specifically  is  emphasized  it’s  the  relevance  of  the  potential  link  between  the  
divested unit and the parent firm and the effects associated to the tightness of this 
relationship on performance (Moschieri and Mair, 2011). This depends on the post deal 
involvement of parent managers, on the effective creation of a newly independent firm 
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with an own identity and strategy, and on the development of a common sense of 
opportunity (Moschieri, 2011). 
From a corporate strategy perspective, firms are called to face a variety of 
challenges choosing between integration and independence (Karim and Mitchell, 2000; 
Capron and Mitchell, 2009). Specifically, our evidence confirms that risks and 
opportunities arise from the newly established governance structure. This represents a 
signal used by market investors to evaluate the foreseen value creation associated to the 
operation. 
This thesis should be esteemed in light of some noteworthy limitations. Most of 
them have been already highlighted in each essay. However, one requires some specific 
consideration and refers to the generalizability of our findings.  
A sample of US equity carve outs has been used for our empirical analyses. This 
practise has been mandatory given the necessity to collect detailed information 
concerning the characteristics of the operations and the subsequent governance 
arrangements employed. Since accurate data are provided only for listed companies, 
equity carve outs have represented an ideal room for testing our conjunctures. 
Examining the possibilities for the application of our analyses on a sample of alternative 
divestiture modes opens new avenues for future research.  
Another limitation of the presented empirical analysis resides on the lack of 
individual level data of board of directors composition. This has forced our inferences 
to a limited understanding of the factors that affect market perception of potential 
divestiture value creation. Future research should explore which other characteristics 
enable divestiture value creation signalling to market investors the wealth-related 
implications of this hybrid organization spawning. It is expected that such attributes will 
be valuable signals, especially if employed when underlying economic indicators cannot 
be easily observed and understood.  
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